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Shyshkina Yevheniia

Associate professor of National Technical University

"Kharkiv Politechnic Institute"

PhD in History, associate professor, e-mail:

Yevheniia.Shyshkina@kmpi.edu.ua

**RUSSKIY MIR AS A TOOL OF INFORMATION
WAR IN UKRAINE (2014–2022)**

In the conditions of aggravation of the conflict between Russia and its allies with NATO countries, today it is especially relevant to study the methods of political influence it uses in the public sphere. In addition, the study of Russia's information aggression against Ukraine, especially in the period 2014-2022, is of great practical importance for those countries that today are subjected to its information pressure.

The results of the consideration of the formation and evolution of the Russkiy Mir as a public political technology and its use as an instrument of information warfare in Ukraine in 2014-2022 allow us to draw the following conclusions:

1. The Russkiy Mir was conceived as a political technology, oriented, on the one hand, to attract the Russian diaspora to the strengthening of the Russian state through the return of its most successful figures and/or their comprehensive assistance to the Russian Federation. On the other hand, to create in the public sphere the visibility of mass support for Russia to attract the attention of the leading countries of the Global South and gain their assistance (or neutrality). To this end, the idea of fighting the

unipolar world, which Russia could undertake if it was allowed to become one of the new poles, was publicized.

2. Initially, the Russkiy Mir used “soft power,” that is, influence through the creation of centers of Russian culture and support for the Russian language. At the same time, there was a diversification of the ideological content of the Russkiy Mir. This was supposed to help attract people with different political beliefs, historical memory, and religious preferences. However, the Munich Speech had the opposite effect and led to a strengthening of the unifying forces of the Western democracies, while the countries of the Global South were in no hurry to support Russia. At the same time, a “course” for the resumption of Russian “greatness” had already been set within the country.

3. As a result, Russia had to shift its priority from the Russkiy Mir I (successful Russian diasporas in the world) to Russkiy Mir II (the Russian-speaking population of the former Soviet republics allegedly oppressed by the authorities). This allowed its territorial expansion (the annexation of Crimea) - a small victory to prove to its citizens the “greatness” of Russia. However, further efforts to seize Ukrainian territories were not successful. Information efforts were aimed at splitting the country and stimulating civil confrontation. For this purpose, the latest achievements of digital information technologies were used, mostly borrowed from the sphere of Internet marketing.

4. The most successful of them, in our opinion, was a combination of several methods of influence:

1) creation of a large sector of Russian-language propaganda content on the Internet;

2) involvement of scientists from different fields, including historians, in the preparation of such content;

3) filling it with propaganda templates, “newspeak” phrases, fakes to reduce attention (a common method of attracting new members in religious sects), i.e. taking people out of a rational state, transferring consciousness into subconsciousness;

4) opening “trolling farms” that perform the function of moderating “public opinion”, implementing “digital censorship” and “repression”, as well as sending messages with links to propaganda content;

5) artificially drawing people through the effect of the “filter bubble” into the boil with propaganda information, isolating the user through this effect from other sources of information i.e. creation of a digital “iron curtain”,

6) using people who have been influenced to further broadcast propaganda templates to their relatives, friends, acquaintances offline.

The main limitation of this method is Russian-language content. Other approaches (e.g., use of visuals) were used but not prioritized during the period studied.

Ялова Світлана Василівна

*магістрантка I курсу другого магістерського рівня освіти
ОП Середня освіта (Українська мова і література). Середня освіта
(Мова і література (англійська))*

*ДВНЗ «Донбаський державний педагогічний університет»
(м. Слов'янськ – м. Дніпро, Україна)
e-mail: svetaivaniv2017@gmail.com*

Маторіна Наталя Михайлівна

*кандидат філологічних наук, доцент,
докторант кафедри полоністики і перекладу
факультету філології та журналістики
Волинський національний університет імені Лесі Українки
(м. Луцьк, Україна) e-mail: n.m.matorina@gmail.com*

**УСЕ ПІЗНАЄТЬСЯ В ПОРІВНЯННІ, АБО ЩЕ
РАЗ ПРО ЕЛЕМЕНТИ КОМПАРАТИВНОГО АНАЛІЗУ
НА УРОКАХ КОМПАРАТИВІСТИКИ**

Однією з основних умов світових стандартів щодо майбутнього вчителя-словесника, зокрема зарубіжної літератури, є володіння ним теорією і практикою літературно-літературознавчої компаративістики. Такі знання, уміння й навички здобувачів вищої освіти закладів вищої освіти педагогічного спрямування стануть у пригоді при орга-